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Abstract. Pavel Florensky (1882–1937), a Russian theologian, philoso-
pher, and mathematician, argued that the religious discourse is essentially
contradictory and put forward the idea of the logical theory of antino-
mies. Recently his views raised interesting discussions among logicians
who consider him a forerunner of many non-classical logics. In this pa-
per I discuss four interpretations of Florensky’s views: paraconsistent,
L-contradictory, non-monotonic and rhetorical. In conclusion I argue for
the integral interpretation which unites these four approaches.
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1. Introduction
Pavel Florensky (1882–1937) was the ﬁrst man who attempted to combine Or-
thodox theology with modern logic.1 In 1914 he published the famous book
The Pillar and the Ground of Truth [18], in which he aimed to express the
truth of Orthodoxy by various means of his contemporary culture, including
1 This paper is an extended version of my chapter [37]; I give more comprehensive discussion
of Florensky’s logic in my forthcoming book [39].
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art, literature, philosophy, science, and, notably, mathematical logic. Regard-
ing logic, Florensky argued that the ultimate religious truth goes beyond the
available formal categories, and Christianity is essentially antinomical. As he
believed, the Holy Scripture and the Christian dogmatics consist of true, yet
contradictory, statements, and these contradictions should not be forcibly re-
solved, but rather willingly accepted as a proper expression of the religious
truth. To him, the highest summit and the deepest source of antinomies was
the dogma of the Holy Trinity. Florensky, however, not only pointed out that
diﬀerence but also tried to sketch the idea of a new logic of antinomy which
could deal with religious contradictions.
Florensky’s book initiated a major debate among Russian theologian-
s and religious philosophers, ﬁrst in Russia, and then, after the communist
revolution, also abroad, among exiled scholars. It has been reviewed by such
eminent ﬁgures as Nicholas Berdyaev, Evgeny Trubetskoy, Vasily Rozanov,
Georges Florovsky and many others (see [23]). Sergei Bulgakov and Alexei
Losev directly took and developed many Florensky’s ideas. However, neither
of these authors was a logician and hence they could hardly understand, and
even less discuss, the logical aspects of Florensky’s work. Only recently, at
the beginning of the new century, mostly among Russian logicians, the logical
ideas of Florensky raised serious discussions. Most commentators appreciate
his professional mathematical background. As Viacheslav Moiseev, a contem-
porary Russian philosopher, put it, Florensky was “a philosopher and a priest,
a philologist and a mathematician, a poet and an engineer—and all this was
combined in one person which mastered each of these activities fully profession-
ally” [28, p. 116]. Florensky is supposed to receive an “excellent mathematical
education” [8, p. 38], to be “quite familiar with his contemporary symbolic
logic” [42, p. 172], and his Pillar and the Ground of Truth is assessed as “a
work of great logical, mathematical, and philosophical rigor” [19, p. 175]. It is
often suggested that Florensky anticipated many logical ideas developed only
long after his death, such as paraconsistent [7, p. 20], [8, pp. 31, 62], [33], [35,
p. 98], [42, pp. 167, 176] non-monotonic [42, p. 167], many-valued [8, p. 68],
and probabilistic logics [8, p. 70]. In short, Florensky is usually considered a
genius and “the adequate and deeper understanding of the greatness of that
personage is a matter of future” [7, p. 21].
There is, however, also the other side of Florensky’s logic. First of all,
it is surprising that suspiciously many of logical formulas in his works prima
facie make no sense. This is true not only about his own logical symbols, which
often lack a determine meaning, but also about his attempts of formalization
in standard predicate language. Perhaps some cases are simple misprints; oth-
ers might be the result of the ambiguity of logical connectives. Nevertheless,
too many formulas seems to be plainly wrong. What is worse, his own clari-
ﬁcations are often not helpful at all. As it was put by Irina Gerasimova, “in
Florensky’s texts the formal formulas in the exact language of logic do not
agree with his translation of these formulas and explanations given in natu-
ral (Russian) language” [20, p. 79]. In some cases the explanations given by
Florensky directly contradict the symbolic formulas (see for instance [15, pp.
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88, 90]; cf. [38, p. 138]). Not surprisingly, some commentators simply reject
Florensky’s logical views as meaningless. For instance, Viacheslav Bocharov, a
famous Soviet logician, took his ideas as plain “abracadabra in Hegel’s spirit”
[9, pp. 122–123]. He was also disgusted by his colleagues, Boris Biriukov and
Igor’ Priadko, who believed that they may contain profound truths [9, p. 124].
In the face of such problems, some commentators, such as Gerasimova, pro-
posed to read logical formulas not literally, as expressing some logical content,
but rather metaphorically, as poetic or rhetorical devices. The problem with
Florensky is however even more wider. Andrei Bronnikov even opposes calling
him a scientist or mathematician [10, pp. 91–92]. Though Florensky was fa-
miliar with scientiﬁc and mathematical concepts and was able to use them in
his works, his true goal was never the scientiﬁc explanation of the world. What
he wanted to do was to create a “syncretic meta-language of theology, science,
and art” [10, p. 92]. According to Bronnikov, who himself is both a scientist
and a writer, Florensky’s most important mathematical work, Imaginaries in
Geometry, though written in a form of scientiﬁc treatise, was in fact a kind of
sophisticated poetry. “We cannot”, says Bronnikov, “call Florensky a scientist,
but we can call him a poet of the language of science” [10, p. 113].
In this paper I am going to present, systematize, and summarize the re-
cent discussion on the Florensky’s logical ideas. I adopt here a moderate view.
I believe that Florensky aimed to provide a real logical analysis, even though in
many cases he simply failed to do it. Logical mistakes and oddities should not
however veil his deep insights and intuitions. What we need now is a careful
and sympathetic interpretation and development of his ideas. I will limit my-
self only to the debate raised by his Pillar and the Ground of Truth and only
to his idea of the logic of antinomy in application to religious discourse. First-
ly, I sketch Florensky’s views on antinomies as they stand in his fundamental
work (Sect. 2). Next, I propose a simple classiﬁcation of logical interpretation-
s of Florensky’s views presented by various commentators and brieﬂy review
the paraconsistent, L-contradictory, non-monotonic and rhetorical readings of
his logical theory of antonimy (Sect. 3). Finally, I oﬀer a uniﬁed interpreta-
tion combining some elements from the previous ones (Sect. 4). I believe that
Florensky’s views might be interpreted and developed into a consistent and
insightful theory of religious discourse, ﬁnding indeed, as Christoph Schneider
suggested [41], a third way between the rational ontotheology on the one hand,
and irrational ﬁdeism on the other.
2. Florensky’s Theory of Religious Antinomy
Pavel Florensky’s expressed his view on antinomies most of all in the two
passages in the The Pillar and the Ground of Truth: in Letter Six, directly
devoted to the problem of contradiction, and in one of the additional chapters,
in which he analyzed a logical paradox posed by Lewis Carroll [18, pp. 106–
123 and 355–358]. Letter Six is more general and philosophical, whereas the
appendix on Carroll’s problem is more speciﬁc and logical. For now, I shall
518 P. Rojek Log. Univers.
merely present Florensky’s claims without comments and clariﬁcations, leaving
it over to the next sections.
2.1. The General Idea of Antinomy
Florensky believed that the ultimate truth is essentially antinomic. This is
deﬁnitely the most striking and—for many—the most inspiring logical idea of
his Pillar and Ground of Truth. In Letter Six he states clearly:
For rationality [rassudok ], truth is contradiction, and this contradic-
tion becomes explicit as soon as truth acquires a verbal formulation
. . . The thesis and the antithesis together form the expression of
truth. In other words, truth is an antinomy, and it cannot fail to be
such [18, p. 109].
This is a perfectly clear expression of radical dialetheism [32]. Florensky openly
allowed for some contradictory sentences to be both true. He was fully aware
that by doing this, he undermined the foundation of rational thinking, namely
the principle of noncontradiction. His personal attack on this principle was as
passionate as its famous defense by Aristotle in Metaphysics IV. He urged:
We must not, we dare not, cover contradiction over with the paste
of our philosophemes! Let contradiction remain as profound as it is
. . . The impotent exertion of human rationality to reconcile contra-
dictions should have been repulsed long ago by a bold acceptance
of contradictoriness [18, p. 116].
It seems therefore, that Florensky might be seen as an early proponent of the
non-classical logic, based on the rejection of the principle of noncontradiction.
Florensky not only put forward the idea of dialetheism but also attempted
to sketch a kind of formal theory of antinomy2. First of all, he proposed the
following “symbolic deﬁnition of the antinomy”:
P = (p ∧ ¬p) ∧ V. (1)
An antinomy P is a conjunction of thesis and antithesis accompanied
by a sign “V” meaning “truth” (veritas). The addition of that symbol was
intended to distinguish the necessary philosophical antinomies, rooted in the
nature of things, and mere contingent formal contradictions, resulting from
simple mistakes. As Florensky clariﬁed,
For pure logic, V in the deﬁnition of P is only . . . an indication of
the relation that is required toward it; V is a ﬁnger pointing to the
sky in the presence of P . . . In the rational sphere only authority is
that ﬁnger which indicates the truthfulness of P [18, p. 113].
2Florensky adopted the old-fashioned symbolism of Peano and Russell; here and henceforth,
I translate it into a more accessible notation. Note that Florensky accepted two ways of
reading of logical connectives. For instance, he claimed that sign “⊃” might be read either
as propositional “implication” or as set-theoretical “inclusion” [16, p. 600]; unfortunately this
important clariﬁcation has been omitted in English translation, see [18, p. 425, translator’s
note]. Here I follow solely the ﬁrst, more standard reading. For an attempt of interpretation
the second reading see [6, pp. 165–166].
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The special symbol “V” is necessary, since the logical structure of the true
deep antinomies and mere apparent contradictions are exactly the same. In a
deeper sense, this symbol “raises the antinomy above the plane of rationality”
[18, p. 113], and “represents . . . the spiritual unity, the supersensuous reality of
antinomy”, which is “experienced and perceived directly” in “the Holy Spirit”
[18, pp. 113–114].
I leave aside here the question of philosophical sources of Florensky’s
dialetheism. There have been many authors who had expressed similar intu-
itions before. Florensky himself admitted being generally inspired ﬁrst of all
by Immanuel Kant.
In the history of the shallow and boring thought of “modern philosophy”,
Kant had the boldness to utter the great word “antinomy”, which violated the
decorum of the apparent unity. For this alone he would have merited eternal
glory [18, p. 117] (see also [14] and [18, p. 347]).
Though the term “antinomy” is quite a recent invention, the very idea
of self-contradictoriness of rational thinking is as old as philosophy. Florensky
traced it down in Heraclitus, Plato, Nicholas of Cusa, and, more recently,
in Hegel, Fichte and Schelling [18, pp. 114–118]. He claimed to have found
antinomic intuitions also in contemporary linguistics, mathematics, philosophy
and theology [18, p. 488].
There are also some interesting historical parallels of Florensky’s view
which I cannot investigate here. Florensky worked on his logical theory of an-
tinomy for many years and published his ﬁnal results in 1913. In 1910 a Polish
logician, Jan Lukasiewicz, published a book on the principle of noncontradic-
tion in Aristotle in which he undermined the special status of this principle.
At the same time, in Russia, Nikolai Vasiliev started to publish his papers on
imaginary logics, in which he openly rejected the principle of noncontradiction
(see [25,46,47], cf. [32, pp. 146–147]). Though they lived at the same time,
Florensky, Lukasiewicz and Vasiliev evidently did not know each other, and
hence there is no question of mutual inﬂuence.3
It is unclear what the intended scope of Florensky’s claim was. In some
places he suggested that every truth is in fact antinomic. “Here, on earth,
there are contradictions in everything” [18, p. 117]. When it comes to details,
however, he spoke mainly on religious truths, expressed in Holy Scripture,
dogmatics or liturgy. I shall focus here only on these religious contradictions.
It seems that his theory of antinomy is most convincing as a theory of religious
language, which indeed prima facie contains contradictory statements. His
attempts to prove the general thesis that all truths are antinomic seem to be
very doubtful.
Florensky propounded three general arguments for the contradictory na-
ture of truth. The ﬁrst one might be called epistemological. Florensky noticed
that only the antinomic statements are in fact not refutable and hence indu-
bitable.
3For the relation between ideas of Florensky and Vasiliev see [1, pp. 114–132], [8] and [35,
p. 85]; for the blurred relation between ideas of Lukasiewicz and Vasiliev see [49].
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A rational formula can be true if and only if it foresees, so to speak,
all objections to itself, and answers them. But to foresee all objec-
tions, it is necessary to take not them concretely but their limit. It
follows that truth is a judgment that also contains the limit of all
its refutations, or (in other words) that truth is a self-contradictory
judgment [18, p. 109].4
Therefore, according to Florensky, there is no way to refute antinomies, for
they contain both thesis and antithesis. And that is what makes them the
highest form of knowledge. Second, Florensky made an attempt to formulate
a general, purely logical “proof of antinomy”. He recalled two versions of the
valid reductio ad absurdum principle:
(¬p → p) → p, (2)
(p → ¬p) → ¬p. (3)
Florensky easily proved (2) by the deﬁnition of implication and the law of
double negation, and then obtained (3) by the substitution of p in (2) by
¬ p [18, p. 112]. Both formulas (2) and (3) are plain tautologies of classical
logic. Surprisingly enough, Florovsky claimed that the deduction of (2) and
(3) somehow forms a logical proof of antinomy. He concluded:
So that one has proved not only p (2) but also not-p (3). Thus, we
have obtained two equally indubitable proofs which make up the
antinomy P . . . Using the methods of pure logic we have shown the
possibility of antinomy in the strictest sense of the word [18, p. 113]
[I have changed the numerals in brackets accordingly].
Strictly speaking, this proof, if it was sound, would prove not merely the
possibility, but also the necessity of antinomy.
After that, Florensky proposed a reformulation of his own deﬁnition of
antinomy (1). “For greater clarity”, as he wrote, he joined the antecedents of
(2) and (3), and arrived at the following formula:
P = ((¬p → p) ∧ (p → ¬p)) → p ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬Λ. (4)
The sign “Λ” was thought as opposition of “V” and was supposed to mean
“falsity”. Florensky read (4) as follows: “If antithesis entails the thesis and, at
the same time, the thesis entails the antithesis, the combination of the thesis
and antithesis, if it is not false, is an antinomy” [18, p. 114]. The third, per-
haps most serious, argument is of theological nature. Florensky linked logical
antinomies with the sinful condition of the world in general, and human reason
in particular.
From the point of view of dogmatics, antinomies are inevitable. If sin
exists . . . then our entire being, just like the whole world, is frag-
mented . . . Whatever we take, we inevitably fragment the object
we are considering, split it into incompatible aspects . . . Antinom-
icalness comes from the fragmentedness of being itself, including
rationality as a part of being [18, p. 118].
4Florensky repeated this argument in [17, p. 44].
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The fragmentation of the creation is a result of the original sin. The world itself
is fragmented, and thus all knowledge of it is supposed to be contradictory.
More importantly, this fragmentation concerns also the human reason being
a part of the fallen world. In result, even if the reason turns to the integral
divine reality, as in the case of philosophy or theology, it forms fragmented
and therefore contradictory knowledge. That is why rational knowledge is in-
evitably antinomic.
This result leads us back to the problem of the scope of Florensky’s thesis.
It seems that he simply failed to justify the general claim that all truths are
antinomic. The epistemological argument obviously begs the question since it
presupposes dialetheism. In classical logic the contradiction is simply a mark
of falsity, not of unshakable truth. If a judgment is true, it does not contain its
negation, but rather its negation is false. The following logical argument is also
plainly obsolete. Florensky simply proved the principle of reductio ad absurdum
in two diﬀerent forms. These principles are tautologies of propositional calculus
and together cannot form a contradiction. Finally, the theological argument
might be sound, but only for a religious discourse. Florensky gave no additional
evidence for the thesis that the fragmented reality can be grasped exclusively in
a way of antinomy, though he provided reasons for the contradictory character
of a religious discourse. I conclude therefore, that his theory of antinomy works
best not as a general theory of knowledge, but as a particular theory of the
religious language.
Florensky pointed to three main sources of contradictions in religious
discourse. The ﬁrst one is the religious experience. As he claimed, “an object
of religion, in falling from the heaven of spiritual experience into the ﬂeshiness
of rationality inevitably splits apart into aspects that exclude one another” [18,
p. 119]. That what is spiritually experienced as an integral whole is rationally
thought in contradictory judgments.
The mysteries of religion are . . . inexpressible, unutterable, inde-
scribable experiences, which cannot be put into words except in the
form of contradictions, which are “yes” and “no” at the same time
[18, p. 117].
Therefore “antinomies are the constituent elements of religion, if we conceive
it rationally. Thesis and antithesis, as warp and woof, bind the very fabric of
religious experience” [18, p. 120].
The nature of religious experience is expressed by the theological for-
mulas. Florensky insisted that the “living religious experience” is “the sole
legitimate way to gain knowledge of the dogmas” [18, p. 5]. Dogmatic for-
mulas therefore are supposed to be essentially antinomic. This is true, for
Florensky, ﬁrst of all about the dogma of the Holy Trinity, which accepts one
substance and three hypostases at the same time [18, p. 121], and about the
dogma of two natures of Christ, which are thought to be both “unmerged and
unchanging” and “indivisible and inseparable” [18, p. 121].
Finally, according to Florensky, the contradictions are ubiquitous in the
Holy Scripture, which is also a kind of expression of the religious experience.
He wrote:
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The Holy Scripture is full of antinomies. Not only do the judgments
of diﬀerent Biblical authors . . . intersect antinomically, but this is
even the case for the same author—not only in diﬀerent writings but
even in the same writing, not only in diﬀerent passages but even in
the same passage. Antinomies stand side by side, sometimes in a
single verse [18, p. 120].
The most striking examples are the writings of St. Paul, especially the Epistle
to the Romans, which Florensky called the “antinomy-charged bursting bomb
against the rational mind” [18, p. 121]. Florensky closed the Sixth Letter by an
impressive table displaying most striking Christian contradictions. It includes
for instance the issues of predestination and free will (Rom. 9 vs. Rom 9:30–
10:21), causes of sin (Rom 5:12–21 vs. 1 Cor 15:50), ﬁnal fate (Rom 8:19–23
vs. Rom 2:5–12), retribution (Rom 2:6–10 vs. Rom 4:4, 9:11, 11:6), nature of
grace (Rom 5: 20 vs. Rom 6:1–2), faith (John 3:16–28 vs. John 6:44), and the
character of the coming of the Christ (John 9:39 vs. John 12:47).
As result, according to Florensky, the whole religious discourse, based on
religious experience, is supposed to be antinomic. It is seen also in liturgy and
prayers. “The whole liturgy—he claimed—especially the canons and stichera,
is full of ceaselessly exuberant wit of antithetic juxtapositions and antinomic
aﬃrmations” [18, p. 117]. Florensky’s formal theory of antinomy was designed
exactly to capture such contradictory character of religious thought.
2.2. The Analysis of Lewis Carroll’s Puzzle
In addition to Letter Six of The Pillar and Ground of Truth, devoted to the
problem of contradiction, Florensky in one of the appendixes gave an analysis
of what he called “Carroll’s Problem”. That rather technical text, not easily
accessible for philosophers and theologians not trained in formal logic, was
supposed to develop and clarify the thesis formulated in the body of the book.
Lewis Carroll, an English mathematician and logician, famous as the
author of Alice in Wonderland, published in Mind in 1894 a logical puzzle
known as the Barbershop Paradox [12]. He introduced it as a story about two
uncles passionate in logic who discuss the customs of three local barbers: Allen,
Brown, and Carr. One of them is always in the shop, and Brown appears there
only with Allen. The discussion results in the following two statements:
If Allen is out, then Brown is out, (5)
If Carr is out, then, if Allen is out, then Brown is in. (6)
Uncle Joe argues that from these premises follows that Carr is in, since the
case “Allen is out” would lead to contradiction. Carroll himself believed that
this conclusion was a kind of paradox and saw this as “a very real diﬃculty
in the Theory of Hypotheticals”. “I greatly hope”, he wrote, “that some of
the readers of Mind who take an interest in logic will assist in clearing up
these curious diﬃculties” [12, p. 438]. Indeed, his paradox raised a considerable
debate, which engaged such authors as Alfred Sidgwick, W. E. Johnson, and
Irving M. Copi.
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Quite surprisingly, Florensky saw in this logical puzzle a profound ex-
pression of a crucial problem of the logic of religion.5 He urged that it is not
“extraordinary and artiﬁcially concocted diﬃculty, which has no signiﬁcance
for life”, but rather “evoked by a real need” [18, p. 355], which concerns the re-
lationship between rationality and faith. That is why, according to Florensky,
“for a greater understanding of the step we take when we believe in the Truth”,
it is useful to “solve the aforementioned logical problem in its general form”
[18, p. 335]. First, he reconstructed the paradox in a standard propositional
calculus:
q → r, (7)
p → (q → ¬r). (8)
The question is what follows from these two premises. Florensky brieﬂy re-
viewed two competing solutions. The ﬁrst one, proposed by Lewis Carroll
himself, states that if q → r then it is impossible that q → ¬r, therefore p
entails a contradiction and thus should be rejected. The second one, which
he (rather mistakenly) attributed to the French logician Louis Couturat, s-
tates the opposite, namely that ¬q. Florensky himself claimed that the proper
solution is neither ¬p, nor ¬q but p → ¬q. He proved it in the following way:
¬r → ¬q contraposition of (7), (9)
p → (¬q ∨ ¬r) from (8) and the deﬁnition of implication, (10)
p → (¬q ∨ ¬q) substitution in (10) by (9), (11)
p → ¬q conclusion ([18, p. 356],
cf. [42, pp. 173–175], [6, pp. 164–165], [7, p. 30]).
Ironically, in the Russian original text there is a typo in the conclusion, which
appearently has not been noticed yet by all the editors and translators.6 Flo-
rensky believed that his conclusion somehow unites the two above mentioned
competing solutions. Neither p, nor q are prima facie absurd, but they might
not be true at the same time. His proof is obviously correct. The same solution
of the Barbershop Paradox was given, for instance, by Bertrand Russell in his
Principles of Mathematics [40, pp. 16–18].7 That is why nowadays Carroll’s
puzzle is not considered as a logical paradox but rather as a mere logical mis-
take resulting from the early unclear understanding of the peculiarities of the
logical connectives.
Florensky nevertheless believed that his solution of Carroll’s problem
may help us understand the relation between faith and reason. The sugges-
tion was that the premise p somehow changes the logical status of the other
propositions. He clariﬁed:
5Florensky was not familiar with Carroll’s paper directly. He referred to Couturat and, as
Rhodes noticed, repeated his mistake in reference, see [34, p. 608].
6He put “p ∪ -q” (that is “p ∨¬q”) instead of “p ⊃ -q” (that is “p → ¬q”), see [18, p. 356],
cf. [16, p. 501].
7Russell deeply inﬂuenced Couturat, so he had also indirect eﬀect on Florensky, see [34, p.
611].
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In the presence of p, q is revoked; but in all other cases, it is in
force . . . The usual, everyday, ubiquitous q stops being such under
special conditions, precisely under condition p [18, p. 357].
The condition p, therefore, might be compared with faith, whereas the other
propositions correspond with the rational thought. The leap of faith consists
in the acceptance of p, which modiﬁes the entire worldview. Logics, Florensky
suggested, leaves room for such change.
This interesting general suggestion was developed in one of Florensky’s
examples of the application of the Carroll’s scheme. Florensky proposed the
following puzzle:
A rationalist says that contradiction of the Holy Scripture and of
dogmas prove their non-divine origin, whereas a mystic aﬃrms that
in a state of spiritual illumination these contradictions precisely
prove the divinity of the Holy Scripture and the dogmas. The ques-
tion is, what conclusion should be drawn from these declarations?
[18, pp. 357–358].
This is clearly a particular case of the general scheme discussed above. Here q
is “The Scripture is contradictory”, r is “The Scripture is not-divine”, and p is
“There is spiritual illumination”. The problem might be therefore formulated
as follows: (1) If the Scripture is contradictory then the Scripture is not-divine,
and (2) If there is spiritual illumination then (if the Scripture is contradictory
then the Scripture is divine). Florensky rejected two one-sided answers, namely,
that there is no spiritual illumination (¬p) on one hand, and that there is no
contradictions in the Scripture (¬q), on the other. The logic, he reminded,
suggests merely that p → ¬q, that is, in a state of spiritual illumination, there
is no scriptural contradictions. Again, it leaves open the question whether such
mystical states take place or not.
This particular example of illumination and contradictions links the con-
sideration about Carroll’s puzzle with the general problem of antinomy dis-
cussed above. The suggestion is that there are real contradictions in religion,
but they might be somehow removed or accepted in a special state of mind.
As Florensky put it:
That which is a contradiction, and an unquestionable contradiction,
for the ratio, stops being a contradiction at the highest level, is not
perceived as a contradiction, is synthesized. And, then, in a state of
spiritual illumination, there are no contradictions [18, p. 358].
There are, therefore, two types of thought. For the mere rationality there are
contradictions that witness against divinity. However, there is also the higher
faculty of reason for which former contradictions form a higher unity.
Therefore, there is no need to try to convince a rationalist that there
are no contradictions: they exist, they are unquestionable. But a rationalist
must believe a mystic when the latter states that these contradictions turn
out to be a higher unity in the light of the Sun that does not set, and then
they precisely show that the Holy Scriptures and the dogmas are higher than
ﬂeshly rationality and, thus, could not be thought up by man; i.e. are Divine
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[18, p. 358]. This is, as Florensky points out, “the same conclusion at which
we have arrived in the present text”, that is in the body of the book.
3. Logical Interpretations
Florensky held that religion is essentially antinomic. This claim, however,
seems to be ambiguous in two ways. The ﬁrst question is, whether he un-
derstood logical contradiction in the literal sense. Perhaps, he was talking
about some oppositions, contrasts, or dialectical tensions, which in fact are
not necessarily formally inconsistent. This question is legitimate, since most of
Florensky’s examples, such as Christian dogmas or Holy Scripture, are prima
facie not logical antinomies, but at most merely epistemological paradoxes.
The second question concerns the level of thinking where the alleged
contradictions were supposed to occur. Florensky himself distinguished two
kinds of thought—the lower “rationality” (rassudok) and the higher “reason”
(razum) (see [18, p. 7, translator’s note] and also [48]). This distinction goes
back to ancient Greek philosophy (dianoia and nous), medieval scholasticism
(ratio and intellectus), German idealists (Verstand and Vernunft), and Russian
slavophiles (rassudok and razum). Roughly, the rationality is supposed to be
discursive and conceptual, whereas reason is thought rather as an intellectual
intuition immediately grasping the truth.
Now, combining the possible answers for these two questions, we arrive
at four possible interpretations of Florensky’s view (see Table 1). The ﬁrst one
holds that there are true logical antinomies, and that they are everywhere,
both on the level of rationality and the reason. This way of interpretation
accepts the commentators who put forward a paraconsistent interpretation of
Florensky’s ideas.
The second position holds that there are true contradictions but only
on the level of reason, not rationality. The rational mind can always avoid
antinomies, which nevertheless are necessary for the reason. Such reading of
Florensky was suggested by Viacheslav Moiseev, an author of the original logi-
cal theory of L-inconsistency. Perhaps most commentators accept the opposite
third interpretation, in which contradictions appear on the level of rationality,
but not on the level of reason. Here ﬁts also Evgenii Sidorenko’s interpretation
of Florensky’s view as an early formulation of the idea of non-monotonic logics.
Finally, there is an option according to which there are no true contradictions
Table 1. The classiﬁcation of Florensky’s interpretations
Type of interpretation Rationality Reason
Paraconsistent Inconsistent Inconsistent
L-inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
Non-monotonic Inconsistent Consistent
Rhetorical Consistent Consistent
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in Florensky at all, neither on the level of rational, nor reasonable thought.
An example of this kind of reading is rhetorical interpretation of Florensky’s
views on antinomies, recently proposed by Irina Gerasimova. Now I am going
to present these four interpretations in some details.
3.1. Paraconsistent Logics
Florensky held that the truth is contradictory and therefore rejected the logical
law of noncontradiction. As I indicated, that was not a unique idea among
logicians of his time. Florensky shared some intuitions with Lukasiewicz or
Vasiliev, which are now recognized as forerunners of the idea of paraconsistency
[2,3,5,26]. Paraconsistent logic seems therefore to be the most natural context
for the interpretation of Florensky’s views.
Florensky claimed that religious truth is contradictory, but at the same
time he was not willing to accept any sentences as true. This strongly suggests
that he implicitly rejected the notorious principle of classical logic called the
law of Duns Scotus:
(p ∧ ¬p) → q. (12)
According to (12), a contradiction entails any propositions. As a result, any
formal theory which happened to contain a contradiction, turns out to be
trivial since every possible formula of its language become its thesis. The em-
barrassing principle (12) is, however, well founded in classical logic, and thus
not so easy to remove. It follows from the disjunctive introduction and disjunc-
tive syllogism: if p, then for every q, p ∨ q, and thus if also ¬p, then q. The
alternative logics, which do not allow such deductions, are called paraconsis-
tent. Such formal systems, ﬁrst outlined by a Lukasiewicz’s student Stanislaw
Jas´kowski, then independently formulated by Florencio Asenjo and Newton
da Costa, ﬂourished in Brazilian School of Logic, and were ﬁnally widely pop-
ularized by Graham Priest (see [4,11,13,24], and also [31]). Nowadays it is
perhaps the most established and the most developed branch of non-classical
logic.
Florensky wanted to accept antinomy without accepting its classical con-
sequences, and therefore might be seen as a forerunner of paraconsistent logic.
Such suggestion has been made independently by Russian logicians, such as
Boris Biriukov and Igor’ Priadko [8, pp. 31, 62], [7, p. 20], Evgenii Sidorenko
[42, pp. 167, 176], and American philosopher Michael Rhodes [35, p. 98], [33].
According to the latter, Florensky was “the ﬁrst Orthodox philosopher to un-
derstand both the form of logical reasoning endemic to Orthodox thought as
well as its paraconsistent implications” [35, p. 83]. According to this inter-
pretation, the contradictions in Florensky are literal, not rhetorical. This was
clearly expressed by Rhodes:
the Trinitarian and Christological dogmas of Orthodox thought are
. . . reckoned to be true, in spite of the obvious inconsistencies. They
are not maintained as paradoxes . . . For Florensky, the antinomy
. . . is robust. It is a contradiction . . . This is not hyperbole; it is
clarity [35, p. 95].
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Consistency, Rhodes continues, is therefore rather a mark of heresy [35, p. 98].
The acceptance of the contradictions, however, did not lead to trivialization
of his theory. Again, as Rhodes notices,
Florensky’s paraconsistent logic being grounded in the Holy Trinity
does not allow that “anything follows”, rather it deﬁnes speciﬁc
metaphysical parameters so that heresy as the emphasis of only one
half of an antinomy can be avoided, implying, therefore, not that
“anything follows”, but that orthodoxy follows [33].
What is important here, is that contradictions are thought to be present not
only on the level of rationality, but remain also on the level of reason. As
Biriukov and Priadko suggest, the diﬀerence between the rationality and the
reason lies simply in that the former does not allow contradictions, whereas the
latter accepts it. This is, as they think, the conclusion of Florensky’s analysis
of the Carroll’s problem. “The contradiction of reason is seen only by person
in the state of spiritual enlightenment, accepting the authority of the Holy
Scripture and the truths of Church. That is, the antinomy P is an antinomy
only under the condition s: s → P” [8, p. 59].8 Supposedly, without spiritual
enlightenment, “the antinomy P” could be seen as mere mistake which can be
easily corrected. It is clear, therefore, at least, that even in the state of enlight-
enment, the truths of religion remains inconsistent, only the attitude to them
is changed. That which was unacceptable for rationality becomes welcome for
the reason. Also for Rhodes, Florensky’s solution of Carroll’s problem was not
supposed to remove, but rather to emphasize the contradiction. According to
him, Florensky wanted to accept both p and q, even if—or rather because—p
entails ¬q [34, p. 613].
Commentators disagree as to the value of Florensky’s eﬀorts to develop a
formal theory of antinomies. Biriukov and Priadko appreciate his intuition but
criticize its formal expression. “Here it turns out”, they wrote, “that though
he mastered logical technique, he did not really think through the problem
of how to combine the logical calculus with his own theological position” [8,
p. 55]. This results, for instance, in the futile deﬁnition of antinomy (1). As
they indicate, the sign “V” fails to change the contradiction into truth, since
the whole formula remains false, as previously. Moreover, the ﬁnal version of
antinomy (4) surprisingly turns out to be true, though merely due to the para-
doxical feature of the logical implication which is true when antecedent and
consequent are both false [8, p. 56]. Alas, Florensky’s bold proof of antinomy is
also a simple “logical mistake”. There is nothing antinomic in tautologies (2)
and (3) [7, pp. 27–29] (see also [6, p. 168], [9, p. 123]). Nevertheless, Biriukov
and Priadko are not confused by all these results. They believed that they
could merely show that Florensky’s intuitions were not expressible in classi-
cal logics. According to them, “the presented constructions were used by the
thinker primarily to prove that the schemes of rationality are not suﬃcient for
the concept of Orthodox truth” [7, p. 28] and therefore “most of the ideas of
8Biriukov in his earlier paper claimed that he could not ﬁnd any traces of the idea of
paraconsistency in Florensky’s solution of the Carroll’s problem, see [6, p. 169, note 4].
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Father Paul, concerning the formal aspects of thinking, go beyond the limits
of [classical] logics” [7].
Michael Rhodes is even less critical than Biriukov and Priadko. For in-
stance, he takes Florensky’s formal “proof of antinomy” seriously. Though
Rhodes sees some “logical peccadilloes” in Florensky’s writings, he neverthe-
less believes that Florensky really proved that “both p and ¬p are derived
from their opposites, making together the antinomy P, namely p and not-p”
[33]. Unfortunately, instead of analyzing Florensky’s proof, Rhodes merely re-
produces his formulas and holds that they really undermine laws of identity,
non-contradiction and excluded middle. “His proofs”, claims Rhodes, “nec-
essarily imply that these laws are antinomic” [33]. Regrettably, as I argued
above, this proof is plainly wrong. Even if we agree that Florensky had some
deep insights into logic, we should not lock our eyes on the grave nonsenses in
his logical writings.
3.2. The Theory of L-Contradiction
Now I will turn to the second type of interpretation, which holds that the
religious truths are essentially antinomic, but that contradictions do not in
fact appear on the level of rational thinking, but only on the level of reason.
Ordinary thinking cannot deal with contradictions and therefore always ﬁnds
a way to avoid them. That is why rational thought reaches only the surface of
reality. Its ultimate nature is revealed only in the suprarational illumination.
The task of religious philosophy is to show the limitations of rationality, and
to prepare for the encounter with the ultimate reality.
A logical theory roughly corresponding to this type of interpretation was
formulated by Viacheslav Moiseev [27], [28, pp. 329–39], [29, pp. 28–44], [30,
pp. 97–121] (cf. [36]). The fundamental idea of this theory was directly in-
spired by Florensky’s remarks in the Sixth Letter of The Pillar and Ground of
Truth. Moiseev’s aim, however, is not to give an interpretation of Florensky’s
views. He pursues only his general idea of the “formal logical theory of antin-
omy”, which should provide a “symbolic-logic algorithm” [18, p. 110] for the
analysis of antinomies. Moiseev criticizes Florensky’s own attempts to realize
that program, in particular his formula (1). “Unfortunately”, he writes, “the
form of expression of antinomy proposed by Florensky cannot be considered
as correct” [28, p. 176]. The problem is that in fact every formula can be com-
pleted by the sign “V”. It was supposed to be a neutral symbol, which plays in
logic a similar role as the one in the arithmetic. For every p, p ∧ V, as well as
for every a, a × 1 = a. Florensky therefore failed to express his own insights.
“It is clear”, Moiseev concludes, “that the use of sign V by Florensky has a
metaphorical meaning, which goes beyond the means of logistics” [28, p. 176].
Moiseev’s own theory of antinomies was supposed to capture that missing
meaning of the symbol “V” and thus became a “more adequate” realization
of Florensky’s project [28, p. 176]. Moiseev suggests that the rational mind
can always ﬁnd some logical tricks to avoid contradictions. Indeed, in the face
of contradictory statements, we usually diﬀerentiate their subjects or predi-
cates obtaining more speciﬁc and thus consistent propositions. In some cases,
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however, these solutions themselves pose a similar problem, which requires cor-
responding logical treatments. The true philosophical antinomies, for Moiseev,
can be merely shifted, but never ﬁnally solved. Rational thought arrives as a
result to an inﬁnite series of successive solutions. According to Moiseev, in the
case of true philosophical antinomies, that inﬁnite series of solutions reaches at
its limit the robust contradiction. Such formulas he calls L-contradictions (“L”
for “limit”). The formal theory of L-contradictions is based on the concept of
a sequence of formulas, inspired by the analogy between logic and topology.
Such sequences might be ﬁnite or inﬁnite and, just like in mathematics, might
have their limits. L-contradiction is deﬁned as inﬁnite sequence of formulas
with a contradiction in its limit. Such a sequence corresponds to the idea of
logical antinomy. Nevertheless, the formal theory of L-contradiction is per-
fectly consistent (see the proof in [27, p. 10]). Therefore, it is not a kind of
paraconsistent logic, but an alternative way of dealing with contradictions.
Moiseev does not intend to give an interpretation of Florensky’s view,
but he nevertheless notices that his own theory may help explain the crucial
distinction between the rational and reasonable thought. He wrote:
The rational thought (rassudok) works through devices of formal
logic . . . The reason (razum) adds to the structures of rationality
devices of logic of antinomy, dealing with contradictions and their
solutions, distinguishing diﬀerent kinds of solutions, static and dy-
namic, interacting in many dimensions and levels, which ﬁnds its
most complete logical expression in the framework of logic of L-
contradictions [30, p. 121].
It is clear, therefore, that the rational thinking for Moiseev is free from contra-
dictions, whereas the reason ultimately admits them. The antinomies, however,
are accepted only as the limits of the inﬁnite sequences of consistent rational
formulas.
I would like to present Moiseev’s methods by a simple example of L-
contradiction. Moiseev himself used his theory to analyze Russell’s paradox
[27, p. 15], [28, pp. 333–335], [29, pp. 28–34] and Go¨del’s proof [28, pp. 335–9],
[29, pp. 34–44], suggesting that it also can be adapted for Kantian antinomies of
pure reason. Recently he provided a detailed analysis of the “most important
and most deep” antinomy of the Absolute, which “in many respects lies at
the bottom of all metaphysical antinomies” [30, p. 105]. That fundamental
antinomy claims that the Absolute is everything, and at the same time the
Absolute is nothing. Here I would like to illustrate Moiseev’s approach by an
analysis of a simple version of his antinomy of the Absolute.
The absolute being is usually said to be both immanent and transcendent.
God might be thought as being a part of the world and at the same time as
transcending the whole reality. It seems to be a contradiction. If P means “is a
part of the universe”, and ¬P means “is not a part of the universe”, then the
antinomy of immanence and transcendence might be formulated as follows:
P(a) ∧ ¬P(a). (13)
530 P. Rojek Log. Univers.
Now, the rational thinking might easily resolve that contradiction. It might,
for instance, diﬀerentiate the subject of the contradictory statement. We can
split the subject a into two distinct subjects a1 and a2, say, the “immanent
absolute” and the “transcendent absolute”, to obtain a consistent formula:
P(a1) ∧ ¬P(a2). (14)
The immanent absolute a1 is a part of the universe, whereas the transcendent
absolute a2 is not. Unfortunately, the price for this move is the relativization
of the concept of the Absolute. The general concept of the Absolute forces us
the go beyond all the limits. The transcendent absolute a2, on its way, still
seems to be a part of a world, though it is not our initial world, but a wider
one. That world also should be exceeded. This suggests that we should split
not only the concept of the Absolute, but also the concepts of the world W
and the property of being in the world P. Therefore, there is a sequence of sets
W1,W2,W3, . . . , such that Wn ⊆ Wn+1 and Wn = Wn+1,n = 1, 2, 3 . . . and
the corresponding sequence of properties P1,P2,P3, . . . , such that P1 means
“being in W1”, P2 means “being in W2” and so on. The absolute a1 is a part
of W1 and hence has P1, and the absolute a2 is not a part of W1 and thus
has ¬P1. Next, the absolute a2 is a part of W2, that is has P2, though the
following absolute a3 is not a part of W2 and hence has ¬P2. In general, the
relative immanent absolute an is a part of Wn, that is has Pn, whereas the
relative transcendent absolute an+1 is not a part of Wn and has ¬Pn:
P1(a1) ∧ ¬P1(a2), (15)
P2(a2) ∧ ¬P2(a3), (16)
. . .
Pn(an) ∧ ¬Pn(an+1). (17)
Now, Moiseev introduces here a concept of inﬁnite sequences of formulas. In
this case we obtain the following:
{Pn(an) ∧ ¬Pn(an+1)}∞n=1 (18)
Once we have accepted the sequences of formulas, we can speak about their lim-
its. It seems plausible that the inﬁnite sequence of relative absolutes a1, a2, a3,
. . . approaches the absolute Absolute a: limn→∞{an} = a. Similarly, the
inﬁnite sequence of restricted P1,P2,P3, . . . tends to the unrestricted P :
limn→∞{Pn} = P. So we can analyze the formula (18) as follows:
limn→∞{Pn(an) ∧ ¬Pn(an+1)}∞n=1 = P(a) ∧ ¬P(a). (19)
The limit of the inﬁnite sequence of consistent formulas turns out to be the
initial contradiction (13). In other words, we can solve each case of contradic-
tions, but nevertheless the inﬁnite sequence of such solutions tend to the robust
contradiction in its limit case. It is, therefore, an example of “L-contradiction”.
This particular form, according to Moiseev, is characteristic for the true philo-
sophical antinomies.
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3.3. Non-monotonic Logics
Now I will turn to the third type of interpretation of Florensky’s view. It holds
that there are true contradictions in religious discourse, but that they occur
only for lower rationality, not for the higher transformed reason. It is, there-
fore, a direct opposition of the previous reading. The general idea behind it
is that rational thought cannot grasp religious truth without contradiction,
whereas the higher reason is able to see a higher unity of supposedly contra-
dictory statements. The antinomies of rational thought may thus somehow be
solved by divine illumination. I will try to show that the diﬀerence between
the rationality and the reason might be explained in the terms of additional
premises implicitly denied by the rationality and explicitly accepted by the
reason. This kind of interpretation was ﬁrst proposed by a Russian logician
Evgenii Sidorenko [42]. He is one of that authors who believes that Floren-
sky’s ideas in many aspects preceded the development of contemporary logic.
In particular, as he says, “Florensky put forward a number of ideas, which
were made explicit in our times in the systems of non-monotonic . . . logics”
[42, p. 167]. To reveal this, Sidorenko provides a careful analysis of Florensky’s
discussion on Carroll’s problem.
Sidorenko suggests that Florensky’s main concern in his discussion of
the Barbershop Paradox was the idea that some of our natural conclusions
might be withdrawn in the face of certain supernatural circumstances. This
might be thought, as Sidorenko argues, as an expression of the fundamental
intuition of non-monotonic logics. Classical logic is based on the relation of
logical consequence Cn which satisﬁes conditions of reﬂexivity, idempotency,
and monotonicity:
X ⊆ Cn(X), (20)
Cn(X) = C(C(X)), (21)
X ⊆ Y → Cn(X) ⊆ Cn(Y). (22)
The last principle states that any extension of a set of premises preserves
the possibility of inferring the same conclusions as from the previous set. Non-
monotonic logics rejects that clause and accept the weakened relation of logical
consequence C. On the ground of non-monotonic logics the extension of the
set of premises may lead to rejection of the previous conclusions, or even
to acceptance of their negations. That is, when α ∈C(X) then it is possible
that for some set of additional premises Y holds that α /∈C(X∪Y), or even
¬α ∈C(X∪Y). The operator of consequence C might be also relativized to
some set of implicitly or explicitly accepted premises K: CK(X). That set K
might also contain the principles and rules of interpretation of X, which is
very important in the analysis of religious discourse [44,45]. It is believed that
non-monotonic logics are more adequate to the real human reasoning in the
conditions of restricted time, or limited access to information.
The point of Florensky’s interpretation of Carroll’s problem is that in the
normal situation q → r holds, but under some special condition p, which is
supposed to be illumination of faith, it is not the case that q → r but rather
that q → ¬r. Note, the fact that in Florensky’s reading the proposition q
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concerns the contradictory character of Holy Scripture, is irrelevant here. The
most insightful is the role of the additional premise p, which changes the ﬁnal
conclusion. This is clearly non-monotonic reasoning, which might be further
analyzed with the help of the concept of default assumptions. As Sidorenko
says,
He could agree that in default conditions the statement of incon-
sistency of the Holy Scripture (q) implies its non-divine character
(r), but this implication loses its signiﬁcance under the condition
of spiritual illumination (p). It might be said that the implication
q → ¬r is taken as true because it is actually true that ¬p → (q
→ ¬r), and ¬p is accepted by default [42, p. 176].
The hidden premise of the natural reason is therefore the lack of spiritual
illumination ¬p. This mysterious illumination might be understood not in
psychological or spiritual terms, but simply as the addition of some extra
premises replacing the implicitly assumed default conditions. The religious
illumination is thus an extension of the set of the explicit premises.
Now, the problem was that Florensky tried to express that non-monotonic
intuitions with the help of classical logic. On the one hand “Florensky’s motives
and arguments are perfectly clear from the point of view of simple informal
reasoning and even from the point of view of ordinary common sense” [42,
p. 177], but on the other hand “classical logic of propositions . . . is simply
not able to adequately take into account the reasons underlying Florensky’s
reasoning” [42, p. 177]. Sidorenko points out a number of grave inadequacies
between Florensky’s informal intentions and their logical expression. First, the
characteristic of material implication undermines his eﬀorts to present p as an
additional premise, which transforms the conclusion. The problem is that in
classical logic, an implication stays true even when false implies truth, there-
fore every true proposition might be preceded by any p. Florensky’s additional
premise p becomes thus in fact superﬂuous, since it could be inferred from any
true proposition. Next, the conclusion of his whole reasoning is somewhat am-
biguous. Florensky welcomed the formula p → ¬q, which he read as “If there is
a spiritual illumination, then there are no contradiction in Holy Scripture”, but
this conclusion is—by contraposition—equivalent to q → ¬p, that is, “If there
are contradictions in Holy Scripture, there is no spiritual illumination”. The
problem here is that Florensky openly admitted the presence of contradictions.
Unfortunately, if there are contradictions, then there is no illumination, and,
what is worse, from the implication q → r it follows also that the Scripture
is not-divine. Finally, Florensky’s conclusion fails to express his belief that in
the state of illumination the contradictions in Holy Scripture prove its divine
origin. If there is the state of illumination, then there are simply no contradic-
tions in Scripture. If p, then both q → r and q → ¬r, and therefore ¬q. The
problem is that this conclusion obviously cannot support the divine character
of Scripture. If ¬q then there is no way to get ¬r. Florensky simply did not
notice that problem. As a result, it seems that Florensky’s formal reasoning
is dramatically inadequate to his initial intuitions. The guilt, as Sidorenko
suggests, lies on the side of the limitations of the classical logic.
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The judge, which was appointed by the author, allowed to justify the
claims which he (the author) found desirable. He did not however
notice that at the same time the logic, which he chose as a judge,
allows also to justify many claims which, as we could seen, were in
fact opposed to that which he wanted to prove [42, p. 177].
He concludes that we should reject the formalization of Florensky’s reasoning
in classical logic and seek a way to more adequate expressions.
Sidorenko outlines an alternative interpretation of Florensky’s analysis of
Carroll’s problem on the ground of non-monotonic logics. Florensky’s sugges-
tion was that it usually holds that q → r, but not in the face of the premise
p. It means therefore that it is as a rule implicitly assumed that ¬p, and that
assumption is explicitly rejected in the case p. The premises of the Barbershop
Paradox should be therefore reformulated as:
¬p → (q → r), (7’)
p → (q → ¬r). (8)
Proposition p simply blocks the inference to q → r and implies that q → ¬r.
In this formalization there is no way to make a use of the removed antecedent
q → r. So, the inference to the misleading conclusion that p → ¬q is ﬁnally
blocked. It turns out, as Florensky initially suggested, that in the state of
spiritual illumination there are true contradictions, but now they are seen as
evidences of the divine character of Holy Scripture. As a result, the logic shows
that though there is no way to prove the divine character of the Scripture, there
is also no way to obtain its non-divine character. The additional premises may
always change the supposed charges into beneﬁts.
In this interpretation, Florensky implicitly suggested a new solution to
the Barbershop Paradox. He did neither, as Carroll himself, reject p, nor, as
Couturat, reject q. Though he explicitly accepted p → ¬q, that is ¬(p ∧ q), he
really wanted to say something completely opposite, namely that both p and q
might be true. As Sidorenko clariﬁes, “The point of this is that p undermines
the claim q→ r, that is, that the contradictions always implies non-divine
character. And this is, as it seems, exactly the result, which Florensky wanted
to reach” [42, pp. 182–183].
Going back to the Carroll’s story, it might be said that only if Carr is
in then, if Allen is out, then Brown is out, while if Carr is out, then, if Allen
is out, then Brown is in. One cannot prove therefore that Carr is in. That
is how Florensky should have solved the Carroll’s problem. Unfortunately,
the classical logic, which he adapted for his purposes, made impossible the
adequate expression of his own insights. Non-monotonic logic seems to much
better clarify his own intuitions.
3.4. Rhetorical Turn
Finally, I would like to look at the last possible kind of interpretation of Flo-
rensky’s views, which fundamentally opposes the previous ones. According to
it, there are in fact no real logical contradictions, neither on the level of ratio-
nality, nor on the level of reason. Florensky’s so called antinomies are merely
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hyperboles aimed at shocking the reader and making him think in a new way.
This interpretation obviously undermines all attempts to construct formal the-
ories of antinomies.
Many readers of Florensky’s work are confused by his reckless use of the
concept of antinomy. Religious experience is actually sometimes reported in
really contradictory terms, but are the Holy Scripture or Christian dogmatics
truly antinomic? The Church Fathers, who put so much eﬀorts into consistent
exegesis of the Bible and coherent clariﬁcation of the Christian teaching, would
probably be deeply disappointed by such a view.9 The inadequacy of Floren-
sky’s view is particularly striking in the case of the basic theological dogmas.
He claimed emphatically that they are essentially antinomic. Nevertheless the
thesis that God is one in nature and three in hypostasis is prima facie not a
case of contradiction, since it obviously concerns two diﬀerent aspects of the
divine reality. The same is true about Christ, who is one person with two na-
tures. Perhaps dogmatic deﬁnitions indeed involve implicit contradiction, but
this should be argued, not simply assumed.
This consideration leads to the hypothesis that Florensky used the term
“antinomy” in a loose and wide sense, not adequately captured by the concept
of contradiction in formal logic. Robert Slesinski, one of the ﬁrst Florensky’s
commentators in the West, wrote:
Florensky’s deeply felt intuitions concerning the true nature of reli-
gious dogma notwithstanding, the requirements of conceptual clarity
and terminological rigor demand that he be faulted for his poetic li-
cense and propensity for literary ﬂourish. Speciﬁcally, we must ques-
tion whether “contradiction” is the most felicitous choice of words
[43, p. 147].
Slesinski points out that for Florensky “contradiction”, “antinomy”, and, no-
tably, “coincidence of opposites” are interchangeable terms. He believes that
from that three, the word “antinomy” is the most acceptable but only when
used in an informal, not strictly logical way. In particular, “antinomy” should
not imply robust contradiction. “Florensky’s appeal to ‘contradiction’ may,
indeed, more strikingly bring home his point, but it does so only at the price
of a certain conceptual deception and obfuscation” [43, p. 142]. It seems to
me that the term “paradox” would be even more appropriate here. Paradox is
something which goes against the expectation but not necessary against the
logic. The religious experience, the Holy Scripture and the Christian dogmat-
ics might therefore be paradoxical in a broad sense, without being antinomic
in the strict meaning.
Recently, Irina Gerasimova proposed a kind of rhetorical interpretation
of Florensky’s theory of antinomies [20]. She reminds us that Florensky was
more poet, writer, and preacher than mathematician or logician. His concept
of antinomy derived therefore from rhetoric rather than from logic. The con-
trast of the thesis and the antithesis is a well known classical device. Making
9Note, however, for instance Gregory Nazianzen’s discussion of paradoxes in his Third The-
ological Oration [22, pp. 250–251]; cf. [21].
Vol. 13 (2019) Pavel Florensky’s Theory of Religious Antinomies 535
striking comparisons, using abundant hyperbolas, highlighting contrasts, and
introducing thought-provoking oppositions, Florensky was simply a faithful s-
tudent of the ancient art of speaking. The point is, however, that in fact none
of these rhetorical devices are adequately analyzable as formal contradiction.
More speciﬁcally, Gerasimova distinguishes three aspects of so called an-
tinomies in Florensky’s writings. Firstly, the logical (or rather epistemological)
one helps to see complements and alternatives for the accepted thesis. Second-
ly, the communicative aspect concerns the use of antinomy in rhetoric. Thirdly,
the psychological aspects reveals the role of such formulations in stimulating
emotions and creative thinking. In all these cases antinomies are not thought
literally as logical contradictions. As she concludes,
In most cases the logical connective “and” uniting the thesis and the
antithesis represents the level of the metalanguage . . . The propo-
sition p combined with negation ¬p changes its meaning in virtue
of the change of its context. It would be more appropriate to write,
for example, “p” for thesis and “q” for antithesis [20, pp. 86–87].
In other words, Florensky’s basic formula for antinomy (1), which involves a
true logical contradiction, turns out to be fundamentally misleading.
Gerasimova carefully analyzes Florensky’s list of the alleged contradic-
tions in the Holy Scripture form Letter Six of The Pillar and Ground of Truth
[20, pp. 89–95]. The antinomy of grace, for instance, is only an apparent con-
tradiction since Rome 5:20 describes the actual state of being, whereas Rome
6:10 and 6:15 concern the desired state. Similarly the antinomy of faith be-
tween John 3:16–18 and John 6:44 consist in fact of two complementary, not
contradictory statements. Finally, the antinomy of Jesus’ judgement simply
describes the diﬀerent moments in history: his ﬁrst coming in John 12:47 and
the second coming in John 9:39. In all these cases we have merely rhetorical
ﬁgures, not logical contradictions. They are rather cases of complement state-
ments concerning the diﬀerent aspects of reality, describing the diﬀerent stages
of the one process, or addressed to diﬀerent audience. As she concludes,
The opposition between the thesis and antithesis is not a formal
or logical contradiction in the sense of classical logic. The ﬁgure of
antinomy, which looks as logical contradiction from the outside, was
supposed to produce an intense rhetorical eﬀect and stimulate an
emotional experience [20, p. 94].
If this is true, the whole project of the logical theory of antinomy seems to
be a result of a misunderstanding of a rhetorical device. What we really need
here is not a new logic but rather proper hermeneutics.
4. Towards the Integral Theory of Antinomy
It is not easy to determine what exactly his logical view on religious antinomies
was. His original statements are so unclear, vague, and in many cases incoher-
ent that they allow for many diﬀerent interpretations. I brieﬂy reviewed here
four diﬀerent types of analysis of Florensky. None of them were supposed to
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be comprehensive studies of his views. Most commentators take into account
only selected passages from Florensky’s writings; others are just inspired by
his general ideas. While the paraconsistent, L-contradictory, and rhetorical in-
terpretations focus on Florensky’s idea of the theory of antinomies from Letter
Six, the non-monotonic interpretation departs mainly from the discussion of
Carroll’s Paradox. Nevertheless, I believe that all of them, to some extent, ex-
press Florensky’s views. Now I would like to sketch an integral interpretation
which unites the results of all discussed approaches.
First of all, it seems clear that many, perhaps most, of Florensky’s an-
tinomies are in fact merely rhetorical devices, not true logical contradictions.
Accordingly, in many cases, the rhetorical interpretation is the best reading
of Florensky’s claims. This strategy particularly applies to the alleged contra-
dictions in Holy Scripture. Most of them can be, and actually were, resolved
in many ways without violating the laws of classical logic. The same is true
about many supposed contradictions in the description of the religious expe-
rience and Christian dogmatics. The ﬁrst task in the process of interpretation
of Florensky’s view is therefore a thorough critique of all these alleged cases
of religious antinomies.
However, in some limited cases, the issue is more complicated. It seems
plausible that some religious statements might indeed be truly contradictory.
Notwithstanding, the admission of contradictions is deﬁnitely not supposed to
make it logically trivial. Contradictions are allowed only in isolated spheres
and should not aﬀect the rest of the system of beliefs. Paraconsistent logic is
then very useful here.
Nevertheless, even such tamed antinomies in religious thinking are not
the desired and the ultimate state. The contradictions appear only within
natural thinking, which is not able to express the religious experience. The
development of the religious system consists of making it consistent through
the formulation of dogmas. The process starts with contradictions appearing
in an initial conceptual scheme, and then transforms that scheme to resolve the
contradictions. The dogmas might be seen as concepts and principles which
make possible the adequate and consistent description of the reality of religion.
Dogmas therefore are not to reproduce, but rather to reduce antinomies. This
whole process might be described in the general frame of non-monotonic logic.
Let R be a set of religious statements, such as the data of the revelation and/or
the reports of the religious experience. At the ﬁrst level, R contains some real
contradictions. That is, for some p,
p ∧ ¬p ∈ C(R). (24)
It is crucial here to avoid the triviality of C(R). That is why we really need to
adopt a paraconsistent approach on this level. This is not the end, however.
The contradictions in the religious discourse are only the beginning of the
process of enhancement of natural rationality. This process might be thought
simply as an enrichment of operation C by a set of additional premises and
heuristics. Such a set, say D, is supposed to correspond to the dogmatics
of religious discourse. This suggests a clear interpretation of the distinction
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between rational and reasonable thought. The concept of rationality might be
identiﬁed with the natural consequence C, whereas the concept of reason with
the consequences C enabled with the premises D, that is CD. Hence, we obtain
two supersets of the religious statements R, closed under the operations C or
CD, that is containing solely formulas produced by the operations of natural
or dogmatic consequences. The enlightenment by faith is seen here not as a
spiritual change of the person, but rather as an enrichment of the accepted
operation of logical consequence. Now, the point is that the contradictions
which appear for C might not appear for CD:
p ∧ ¬p /∈ CD(R). (25)
In other words, contradictions are really a matter of lower rationality, not of
the higher reason. What is important, we need not deny here the presence
of true contradictions in religious discourse. The formula (24) is still valid,
though not ultimate. The religious experience is not consistently expressible
in natural language, but might transform the language to a non-contradictory
description of the divine reality.
Finally, it seems that also L-contradictory interpretation might help to
clarify the development of dogmas. We start with an inconsistent set of R,
which might be made consistent by the addition of premises D. There might
be, however, a new revelation which could add some statements making R
inconsistent again and therefore inducing the need of a new dogmatic modi-
ﬁcations. It seems that this might be the historical case of, for instance, the
development of judaic monotheistic theology into Christian trinitarian dog-
matics. Now, this situation might suggest that in fact there is a sequence of
sets R1,R2, . . . ,Rn, such that Rn ⊆Rn+1 and Rn = Rn+1,n = 1, 2, 3, . . . , and
the corresponding sequence D1,D2, . . . ,Dn, such that D1 makes R1 consistent,
D2 makes R2 consistent and so on. The sequence of statements
{CDn(Rn) is consistent ∧ CDn(Rn+1) is not consistent}∞n=1 (26)
would be of course L-contradictory.
But this is not a necessary move. Recall that in the case of the true L-
contradiction the solution of the problem at level n produces the same problem
at the level n+1. For instance, as we have seen, the concept of the Absolute goes
beyond all possible limitations. It is not clear, however, whether it is the case
with the revelation and its dogmatic expression. It might be that dogmatics
on a particular level simply succeed in making the available religious discourse
consistent. If that would be the case, the sequence of the statements would
be consistent and ﬁnite, and thus there would be no L-contradiction in its
inﬁnite limit. The development of human thought gradually leads to a less
contradictory view of divine reality.
I believe that such a complex, non-monotonic model is the best inter-
pretation of Florensky’s views. Though he boldly emphasized the antinomic
character of religious discourse for rationality, he also clearly allowed for a
consistent expression of the faith for illuminated reason. Natural philosophy
might therefore transform into supranatural thought. And this transformation
might start here, by the illumination of faith. This takes places, as Florensky
538 P. Rojek Log. Univers.
suggested, in the minds of the saints, puriﬁed by ascesis and ﬁlled by divine
grace. “In this mind, the healing of the ﬁssures and cracks has begun; the
sickness of being is being cured; the wounds of the world are being healed. For
this mind itself is the healing organ of the world” [18, p. 118]. As I argued
here, such a mind might be identiﬁed with the non-monotonic operation of the
logical consequence, and the illumination by grace might be interpreted as the
addition of a set of dogmatic premises. Suprarational thought is therefore a
new consistent superset of the religious discourse closed under the operation
of dogmatic consequence.
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